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Abstract 
Owned objects occupy a privileged cognitive processing status and are viewed almost 
as extensions of the self. It has been demonstrated that items over which a sense of 
ownership is felt will be better recalled than other items. As autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD) is characterised by an impaired self-concept, people with ASD may not 
demonstrate this ownership effect. Two experiments were conducted which replicate 
Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae (2008).  In Experiment 1, neurotypical 
adults completed a card sorting task and cards belonging to the ‘self’ were better 
remembered than cards belonging to the ‘other’. In the second experiment, adults with 
ASD recalled self- and other-referent items equally well. These results shed light both 
on the nature of the self-concept in ASD and the relationship between sense of self 
and the ownership effect. 
Keywords: Autism spectrum disorder, recognition memory, ownership, self-reference 
effect, self-awareness 
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1.1 The Relation between Memory and the Self 
 
Memory and the self appear to be intimately related.   For example, Howe and 
Courage (1997) suggest that the presence of a self-concept is a pre-requisite for the 
emergence of autobiographical memory. Others (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Wang 2001) have suggested the relationship between memory and the self is cyclical, 
whereby a fully-functional, dynamic self-concept depends upon the organisation and 
retrieval of personally meaningful events generated by autobiographical memory, yet 
in order for a person to encode and make sense of these autobiographical memories, a 
concept of self must be present to analyse and evaluate their content. 
Our understanding of the nature of the self has therefore been informed by 
investigating the effects of self-related processing on memory and cognition.  A prime 
example of this is the self-reference effect.  The self-reference effect refers to the 
finding that stimuli relating to the self, either implicitly or explicitly, are processed 
preferentially to stimuli that do not relate to the self (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
This effect is most clearly evident within the domain of memory and numerous 
studies have demonstrated that memory for personality trait adjectives which have 
been processed in relation to the self (for example by answering the question “Are 
you clever?”) are recalled or recognised with greater accuracy than trait adjectives 
processed in relation to another person (for example “Is Meryl Streep clever?”) 
(Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977).  Recent studies have suggested that this effect 
extends to physical objects, as well as linguistic descriptors, with which an agent feels 
a sense of identification or over which an agent feels a sense of ownership 
(Cunningham, Turk, MacDonald & MacRae, 2008). This form of the self-reference 
effect has been termed the “ownership effect” (Beggan, 1992).  
 
1.2 The Ownership Effect 
It has been suggested that owned objects (i.e. objects that a person feels a 
personal investment with and which are deemed to be relevant to the self in some 
way) occupy a privileged cognitive processing status, being treated almost as 
extensions of the self (Beggan, 1991).  For example, the perceived value of owned 
objects is higher than that of non-owned objects (the “endowment effect”: Kahneman, 
Knetsch & Thaler, 1991), and owned objects are considered to have more positive 
characteristics than non-owned objects (the “mere ownership effect”: Belk, 1991).  
Moreover, recent research has shown that the sense of ownership also has pronounced 
effects on memory. For example, adult participants who were told that they owned 
certain items were significantly more likely to later recognise these items than those 
they had been told were owned by a confederate (Cunningham, Turk, MacDonald & 
MacRae, 2008).  This ownership effect is apparent in memory among young children 
as well as adults. For example, children aged between 4 and 6 years who had sorted 
pictures of everyday objects between “their” basket and a confederate’s basket were 
more likely to recognise self-owned than other-owned items (Cunningham, Vergunst, 
Macrae & Turk, 2012).   This implies that sense of ownership is a relatively early 
developing psychological aspect of self that clearly affects memory and cognition.   
 
  1.3 The Self and Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder characterised by 
impairments in social-communication, and by restricted and repetitive behaviour and 
interests (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). It has been suggested that an 
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impaired sense of self or self-concept may contribute to these core impairments (see 
Frith, 2003; Hobson, 1990).                                                                                     
Historically, autism has been linked to the self, with clinicians variously 
viewing the disorder both as an extreme form of egocentrism (Bleuler, 1905), and  
more recently a complete absence of the sense of self (Frith, 2003).  Yet, in ASD, 
some aspects of self-awareness appear to be relatively intact.  Williams (2010) has 
suggested that, whereas physical aspects of self may be intact in ASD, psychological 
aspects may be specifically impaired.  Indeed, existing sources of evidence are largely 
consistent with this position.  For example, children with ASD typically display 
mirror self-recognition (relying on awareness of physical appearance) once they have 
reached the mental age of 18 months (Ferrari & Matthews, 1983), in line with their 
typically developing peers. Equally, children with ASD are able to recognise delayed 
video images of themselves (Lind & Bowler, 2009) and discriminate between self and 
other caused changes in their environment (Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2014a), 
which relies on awareness of physical agency.                                                                                                               
In contrast, psychological aspects of self appear to be impaired in people with 
ASD. The high levels of alexithymia (an inability to describe one’s own emotions) 
(e.g., Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004) and the unusual patterns of pronoun use (e.g., 
confusing “I” or “me” with “you”; Lee, Hobson & Chiat, 1994) seen in those with 
ASD are consistent with this proposal. Indeed, sometimes impairments in 
psychological aspects on self can be revealed by mirror image enhancements in 
awareness of physical aspects of self (Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 2010).  Similarly, 
children with ASD show a greater degree of impairment on “self-versions” of classic 
theory of mind tasks, in which they are required to recognise mental states, such as 
beliefs and intentions, in themselves (e.g. Williams & Happé, 2009, 2010; see also 
Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2014b).  Arguably, this all suggests that awareness of 
more psychological aspects of self may be diminished in ASD (Williams, 2010; 
Uddin, 2011). 
Evidence concerning the self-reference effect (discussed above in section 1.1) 
in ASD is particularly relevant to understanding psychological aspects of self in this 
disorder (see Lind, 2010, for a review).  In the first study of this effect in ASD, it was 
found that participants with ASD failed to show the expected memory advantage for 
self-referent words (during the study phase, they had been presented with the words in 
the context of the following question: “Is the meaning of the word similar to - ?”), as 
compared to words which had been processed at the semantic level (at study they had 
been presented with the words in the context of the following question: “Does the 
word describe you?”) (Toichi et al., 2002).   However, this study included no other-
person reference condition and so did not directly compare self-referent and other-
referent processing. As such, this study did not directly test the self-reference effect 
and the results could potentially have been explained in terms of a more general 
“person reference effect”.  On the one hand, this study demonstrates that people with 
autism may make no cognitive distinction between information relating to the self and 
to semantic information, but it does not necessarily indicate that people with autism 
make no cognitive distinction between the self and the other. Therefore, the self-
reference effect may still be present, if reduced.                                                           
On the other hand,  Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelright and Baron-Cohen (2007) 
directly compared self-referent and other-referent processing, asking participants 
5 
 
whether a number of trait adjectives could be used to describe either themselves, their 
best friend, or a fictional character (e.g. Harry Potter).  In a standard recognition task, 
both participants with ASD and neurotypical comparison participants recognised a 
greater number of words from the self-referential condition than from the best friend 
and Harry Potter conditions.  However, the differences in the numbers of words 
recognised in each of the three conditions were reduced in ASD, and, in particular, the 
difference between the self and the Harry Potter conditions was very small, implying 
that the self-reference effect is reduced in ASD.  In a subsequent study, using children 
rather than adults, Henderson et al. (2009) partially replicated this finding, 
demonstrating that children with ASD displayed an almost complete absence of the 
self-reference effect.   However, while the Harry Potter condition was present, this 
study did not include the best friend condition. This is important because Harry 
Potter, a fictional character, may not occupy the same cognitive processing status as a 
real person, particularly one to whom the participant is close.                                                   
Thus, although there appears to be some inconsistency in the findings 
regarding self-referential memory in ASD, on balance, the self-reference effect 
appears to be reduced in people with the disorder.  This is consistent with the notion 
of impaired psychological self-awareness.  What is not yet known is whether 
individuals with ASD show a reduction in the ownership effect. As argued above in 
section 1.2, the sense of ownership is early to emerge in development and is likely to 
be a key psychological aspect of self, meaning that exploring the ownership effect in 
ASD has the potential to shed further light on psychological aspects of the self in 
ASD.  Thus the currently reported findings examine the nature of the ownership effect 
in ASD.    
 
1.4 The Current Experiments  
The current pair of experiments builds on the work of Cunningham, Turk, MacDonald 
and MacRae (2008) and seeks to ascertain whether the ownership effect is reliably 
present in typically developing adults (Experiment 1) and adults with a diagnosis of 
high-functioning ASD (Experiment 2).  
      Participants in each study completed (a) a recognition memory test (based on 
Cunningham et al.’s, 2008, study), that allowed the ownership effect to be quantified, 
(b) a questionnaire measure (the Private Self-Consciousness Scale; Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975) to assess psychological self-awareness, and (c) a quantitative 
measure of ASD traits (the Autism-spectrum Quotient, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001).  
 The main aim of Experiment 1 was to replicate the ownership effect 
previously observed in typically developing adults (Cunningham, Turk, MacDonald 
& MacRae, 2008). A secondary aim was to establish whether the ownership effect 
was related to degree of psychological self-awareness or sub-clinical levels of ASD 
traits. In Experiment 1, it was predicted (a) that the ownership effect, as measured 
using a recognition memory task, would be present and (b) that the strength of the 
effect would be positively correlated with degree of psychological self-awareness as 
measured by performance on the two questionnaires, and negatively correlated with 
ASD traits.    
Experiment 2 aimed to establish whether individuals with a clinical diagnosis 
of ASD show a typical ownership effect in memory and whether they show 
diminished psychological self-awareness as measured using the questionnaire. This is 
the first time ownership effects have been explored or the private self-consciousness 
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scale (PSC) used in the study of ASD.  Here, it was predicted that (a) the strength of 
the ownership effect would be reduced or absent (due to impoverished psychological 
self-awareness) among participants with ASD, resulting in a significant group 
(ASD/comparison) × referent (self/other) interaction with respect to recognition 
memory.  We did not predict between-group differences in overall recognition 
memory ability, because recognition memory is widely considered to be undiminished 
among intellectually high-functioning individuals with ASD (e.g., Boucher, Mayes, & 
Bigham, 2012).  Rather, we predicted different patterns of performance within-
participants, reflecting a significant ownership effect among neurotypical comparison 
participants, but a reduced or absent ownership effect among participants with ASD; 
(b) the strength of the ownership effect would be positively correlated with degree of 
psychological self-awareness as measured by performance on the PSC, and negatively 
correlated with ASD traits, among both groups of participants.   
 
 
 
2. General Method 
2.1 Stimuli and Materials The stimuli comprised a set of 222 pictures of items 
commonly available to buy in a supermarket. These items were divided into three 
shorter lists of 74 items each. The lists were closely matched for mean word length 
and number of syllables.  A MANOVA revealed that there was no significant 
difference in the number of syllables or the length of words across the three word lists 
F(4,428) = .28, p = .89, ηp2  = 0.89.  Each list rotated through three counterbalanced 
versions of the task, such that each list appeared as ‘self-owned’ target items in one 
version, ‘other-owned’ target items in one version, and lure items in one version. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three versions of the task. Stimuli 
took the form of colour photographs of the items printed onto 885mm x 685mm 
laminated cards with white backgrounds.  During the study phase, self-owned and 
other-owned items were presented on cards with red and blue borders, respectively. 
During the recognition test phase, self- and other-owned target pictures (as well as 
lure pictures) were presented on cards without coloured borders, ensuring that 
participants could not simply use border colour to determine whether items belonged 
to self or other.  
     Participants were given a red shopping basket into which their cards would be 
placed. The experimenter had an identical blue shopping basket. 
 
2.2 Procedure 
 
     2.2.1  Study Phase. 
In the study phase, participants were presented with 148 picture cards (from 
two of the three lists) stacked in a random order.  Half of the pictures (i.e., pictures 
from one list) had a red border and half (i.e., pictures from the other list) had a blue 
border.  Participants were also presented with a blue shopping basket and a red 
shopping basket.   Participants were instructed to place cards with a red border into 
the red basket and cards with a blue border into the blue basket.  Crucially, 
participants were told that they ‘owned’ the red basket and its (eventual) contents 
while the experimenter ‘owned’ the blue basket and its (eventual) contents (although 
it was made clear to participants that they would not get to keep any of the items on 
completion of the task).  It was stressed to participants that, when sorting the cards, 
they should pay attention both to the colour of the border and to the item shown on 
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the card.  Cards were presented in a random order subject to the constraint that no 
more than four red-bordered or blue-bordered cards appeared in a row. 
        
        2.2.2 Test Phase. 
A standard unexpected (yes/no) recognition test was used in which the 148 items seen 
previously in the study phase were presented (but without coloured borders), along 
with 74 previously unseen lure items from the remaining list of items that had not 
been presented in the study phase. Participants were presented with each item 
individually and asked whether or not it had appeared in the study phase.   
        
2.3 Questionnaire Measures 
     Self-awareness was measured using the Private Self-consciousness Scale (PSC - 
Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). The PSC assesses individual differences in levels 
of private self-awareness with a focus on a person’s awareness of their own internal 
thoughts and feelings. This scale has been used extensively to assess internal 
thoughts, feelings and attitudes (Anderson, Bohon, & Berrigan, 1996) (Mittal & 
Balasubramanian, 1987) and has a high test-retest validity (Fenigsteing, Scheier & 
Buss, 1975).  On this scale, participants can score between zero and 27, with a higher 
score indicating greater reported self-awareness of the private self.   
Participants also completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). This reliable and valid 
questionnaire provides a quantitative measure of ASD traits and is sensitive to ASD 
traits in both clinical and subclinical populations. The AQ is scored out of 50 and 
scores of 26 or more are considered to indicate a (potentially) clinically significant 
level of ASD traits (Woodbury-Smith, Robinson, Wheelright, & Baron-Cohen, 2005). 
 
3. Experiment 1 
 
3.1 Participants  
Participants were university students, aged between 18 and 24.  Forty participants (38 
female) took part.   None of the participants had any current or past diagnosis of 
psychiatric disorders, according to self-report.  All participants gave their informed 
consent and received course credit in partial fulfilment of their undergraduate 
psychology degrees for taking part in the study. This study received ethical approval 
from Durham University Psychology Research Ethics Committee.  
      
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Experimental task  
With respect to recognition performance on the experimental task, we calculated hit 
rate (proportion of items seen at test that were correctly recognised as target items 
from the study phase), false alarm rate (proportion of lure items that were incorrectly 
identified as target items from the study phase), and corrected hit rate (hit rate minus 
false alarm rate; this provides an overall picture of recognition memory 
performance)1.  These measures were calculated separately for self- and other-owned 
items.   Table 1 shows the hit rate, false alarm rate, and corrected hit rate for self-
owned and other-owned items.     
[Table 1 here] 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted using corrected hit rate as the 
dependent variable and Referent (self-owned/other-owned) as the within-subjects 
variable.  This revealed a significant main effect of Condition, F(1,39) = 99.88, p < 
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001, ηp2= 0.72. This reflected the fact that the mean corrected hit rate for self-owned 
items was higher than the mean corrected hit rate for other-owned items.  Thus, a 
clear effect of ownership was present, as predicted.   
 
3.2.2 Categorical analysis of experimental task. 
In addition to analysing the ownership effect as a continuous variable in each 
participant group, we also analysed the data categorically.  A general concern about 
only analysing the mean level of experimental task performance in each participant 
group is that it is unclear whether group differences are driven merely by a relatively 
small subset of participants.  For example, in relation to the current study, it may be 
that only a small minority of participants showed the ownership effect.  
    Thus, for the purposes of categorical analyses, participants were deemed to have 
shown an ownership effect if their corrected hit rate for self-owned items was greater 
than their corrected hit rate for other-owned items. Using this definition of the 
ownership effect, 38/40 participants or 95% displayed the ownership effect2. The two 
participants who did not demonstrate the ownership effect recalled equal numbers of 
self and other owned items. 
  
3.2.3 Questionnaire data and relation to experimental task 
Participants scored a mean of 24.05 (SD = 5.87; range: 15-37) on the PSC and a mean 
of 12.52 (SD = 5.94; range: 2-23).  For the purpose of the correlation analyses, a 
difference score (corrected hit rates for self-referent items minus corrected hit rates 
for other referent items) was calculated and used as a measure of the size of the 
ownership effect. 
There were also no significant correlations between ownership (difference) 
score and PSC score, r = -.12, p = .45. However, in line with predictions, a significant 
negative correlation was found between size of the ownership effect and scores on the 
AQ, r = -.33, p = .04.  
     
 
3.3. Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was threefold; firstly to provide a replication of the 
effect observed by Cunningham, Turk, MacDonald and MacRae (2008) and to extend 
the effect into an adult population, secondly to examine the associations between the 
ownership effect and specific aspects of psychological self-awareness as measured by 
the questionnaires and, thirdly, to act as a baseline for Experiment 2. The larger 
sample size employed here allows us to establish the reliability of this task at 
demonstrating the presence of the self-reference effect in a typical population before 
using it to draw conclusions about the presence or absence of a self-reference effect in 
a population with ASD. 
      As expected, the ownership effect was clearly present in this typically 
developed sample, with self-owned items being recognised significantly more reliably 
than other-owned items.  This is in line with the results obtained by Cunningham, 
Turk, MacDonald and MacRae (2008). This could be seen as providing evidence 
supporting hypotheses such as that of Beggan (1991) who suggested that owned 
objects become a psychological extension of the self. It may even be that the 
ownership effect is stronger than other self-reference biases within the physical 
domain since a sense of ownership appears to emerge at an earlier point in 
developmental time than other aspects of the self-concept and, therefore, may be more 
deeply ingrained within an individual’s psyche (Fasig, 2000). 
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      Data from the PSC was included here to ascertain whether the strength of the 
self-reference effect displayed was related to difficulties expressing inner thoughts 
and feelings. Results revealed that scores on the PSC did not correlate with difference 
scores and this therefore suggests that the PSC is not measuring an aspect of the self 
which is relevant for the ownership effect. In contrast, there was a significant negative 
correlation between scores on the AQ and ownership difference scores, supporting our 
earlier prediction that the ownership effect may be affected by the presence of ASD-
like traits.  This potential link was investigated more fully in Experiment 2, where the 
same task was used with a population of adults with a current diagnosis of ASD. 
 
4. Experiment 2 
 
4.1 Participants 
Sixteen adults with ASD (3 female) and 16 typically developing comparison adults (4 
female) took part in this experiment, after giving written, informed consent. 
Participants were recruited from an existing database of people who had previously 
taken part in studies conducted by the Autism Research Team at Durham University, 
and who had agreed to be contacted about future research projects.  All participants 
received financial compensation for their participation.  Participants in the ASD group 
had all received formal diagnoses of autistic disorder (n = 12) or Asperger’s disorder 
(n = 4), according to conventional criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; 
World Health Organization, 1992).   Diagnostic information was checked thoroughly 
to ensure diagnoses were rigorous and current. In addition to these diagnoses, severity 
of current ASD features was assessed with the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule – Generic (ADOS-G; Lord et al., 2000) (in addition to the AQ, which was 
also used as an experimental measure, as explained in section 2.3).   
         The AQ was administered to both participants in the ASD group and 
comparison participants in order to ensure that comparison participants did not 
display significant ASD-like symptoms and traits. As expected, all comparison 
participants scored below the ASD cut-off on the AQ (< 26 points).  
The ADOS-G is a semi-structured interview and is used as a standardized 
assessment of social interaction, communication, play and imaginative use of 
materials. It is widely used in the diagnostic assessment of ASD.   This measure was 
used with participants in the ASD group only. Two participants declined to complete 
this assessment for personal reasons. Consistent with their formal diagnoses, all 
participants with ASD who consented to taking part in the ADOS-G scored above the 
ASD cut-off (≥ 7 points) on this measure. The two participants who declined to 
complete the ADOS-G scored above the ASD cut-offs on the AQ.  Additionally a 
small minority of participants with a formal diagnosis of ASD scored below the cut-
offs for ASD on the AQ. However, this is likely to have been due to the problems of 
validity which are inherent in using self-report measures. These participants scored 
above the ASD cut-offs on the ADOS and are therefore retained in the ASD group. 
Verbal and non-verbal ability of both groups was assessed using the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). This allowed the two 
groups to be matched as closely as possible for both verbal and non-verbal IQ. The 
groups were also matched closely for chronological age.  Importantly, all effect sizes 
associated with group differences in baseline characteristics of age and IQ were 
negligible.  Participant characteristics are presented in Table 2. 
[Table 2 here] 
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This study received ethical approval from Durham University Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
4.2 Results 
 
4.2.1 Experimental task. 
As in Experiment 1, hit rate, false alarm rate, and corrected hit rate were calculated 
for both self-owned and other-owned items.  Table 3 shows these rates among ASD 
and comparison participants.   
[Table 3 here.] 
 
A mixed-design ANOVA was conducted using corrected hit rate as the dependent 
variable, Referent (self-owned/other-owned) as the within-subjects variable, and 
Group (ASD/comparison) as the between-subjects variable.  This ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of Referent, F(1,30) = 14.99, p = .001 ηp2, = 0.33, reflecting 
superior recognition of self-owned items than other-owned items overall.  The main 
effect of Group was not significant, F(1,30) = 0.34, p = .86,  p2= .001.  However, the 
interaction between Referent and Group was significant F(1,30) = 18.80, p <  .001, 
ηp2= 0.39. 
       A series of paired-samples and independent-samples t-tests was conducted to 
break down this interaction.  Among comparison participants, self-owned items were 
recognised significantly more reliably than were other-owned items, t(15) = 8.68, p <  
.001, Cohen’s d = 0.78.  Thus, comparison participants showed the expected 
ownership effect.  However, among ASD participants, the difference between 
corrected hit rates for self-owned and other-owned items was non-significant, t(15) = 
0.26, p = .80, Cohen’s d = 0.06, reflecting the absence of an ownership effect in this 
group.   Independent-samples t-tests revealed no significant differences between the 
ASD and TD groups in recognition of self-owned items, recognition of other-owned 
items, or in false alarm rates, all ts ≤ -1.04, all ps ≥.30, all ds ≤ 0.42. 
 
4.2.2 Categorical analysis of experimental task. 
     As in Experiment 1, a categorical analysis was carried out on the data and, as 
before, participants were deemed to have shown the ownership effect if their 
corrected hit rate for self-owned objects was greater than their corrected hit rate for 
other-owned objects. All comparison participants (16/16, 100%), but only 7/16 (44%) 
of ASD participants, showed an ownership effect.  This difference between the groups 
was statistically significant and associated with a large effect size, X² = 12.52, p < 
.001, Φ = .63. 
 
4.2.3  Questionnaire data: Group differences and relation to experimental 
task  
 
Participants’ scores on the AQ are shown in Table 2.  On the PSC, participants with 
ASD scored a mean of 22.18 (SD = 4.23; range: 15-30), whereas comparison 
participants scored a mean of 19.25 (SD = 5.59; range: 10-28).  Although there was 
no significant difference between ASD and comparison participants in PSC score, the 
difference was associated with a moderate effect size and approached significance if 
reported one-tailed, t(30) = 1.77, p = .10 (two-tailed), Cohen’s d = 0.59.  It is 
important to note that participants with ASD reported somewhat greater levels of self-
awareness than did comparison participants.   
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As in Experiment 1, a series of correlation analyses was conducted to explore 
the association between the size of the ownership effect (i.e., recognition of self-
owned items minus recognition of other-owned items), and (a) the severity of 
ASD/ASD-like traits (as measured using the AQ) and (b) the degree of self-awareness 
reported by participants (using the PSC) 
In the ASD group, the association between the size of the ownership effect and 
score on the PSC was moderate-to-large in size and only marginally non-significant 
and, r = -.47, p = .06.  Importantly the direction of the association suggests that as 
reported self-awareness increases, the size of the ownership effect decreases among 
participants with ASD.    Among these participants, the correlation between scores on 
the AQ and the size of the ownership effect was small and non-significant, r = -.11, p 
= .69. 
        In the comparison group, the association between the size of the ownership 
effect and score on the PSC was moderate-to-large in size and only marginally non-
significant and, r =.48, p = .06.  Importantly, unlike among ASD participants, the 
direction of the association suggests that as reported self-awareness increases, so too 
does the size of the ownership effect among comparison participants.  A Fisher’s Z 
test indicated that the association between the size of the ownership effect and PSC 
score was significantly more positive among comparison participants than among 
participants with ASD, Z = 2.56, p = .005.  . Finally, the correlation between scores on 
the AQ and the size of the ownership effect was small and non-significant among 
comparison participants, r = -.10, p = .72.   
          
        
4.3 Discussion  
Experiment 2 examined whether the ownership effect seen in Experiment 1 was also 
present in a group of adults with high-functioning autism. As a sense of ownership 
over objects is a key component of the psychological self-concept (Beggan, 1991) 
which is claimed to be impaired in ASD (e.g., Williams, 2010), it was hypothesised 
that this aspect of the self-reference effect would be absent or diminished in the group 
with ASD. 
       Our results were in line with this hypothesis. The comparison group displayed 
a strong self-reference effect, with self-referent items being consistently more 
accurately recalled than other-referent items. This effect was not present in the ASD 
group. This provides further evidence that people with ASD have an impaired or 
unusual psychological self-concept, because psychological ownership over items did 
not influence cognition/memory among participants with this disorder in the same 
way as it did among neurotypical participants.. 
      The questionnaire measures were again included to ascertain whether 
performance on the PSC and/or AQ was related to the strength of the self-reference 
effect.   Among both participant groups, the association between PSC score and the 
size of the ownership effect was borderline statistically significant.  However, the 
direction of the association between these variables differed between the diagnostic 
groups.  Among ASD participants, the association was negative, whereas among 
comparison participants, the association was positive.  In other words, whereas self-
reported awareness of the private self predicted performance on an objective measure 
of the effect of the self-ownership on memory among neurotypical adults, it was quite 
the opposite in participants with ASD.  This finding among ASD participants may 
seem striking.  However, it is not the first time that individuals with ASD have been 
shown to report high levels of self-awareness despite showing diminished 
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performance on an experimental measure of such self-awareness (e.g. Grainger, 
Williams, & Lind, 2014b).  This may imply that diminished self-awareness in this 
disorder is manifested in inaccurate self-report on questionnaire measures, or it may 
imply that experimental measures of self-awareness do not tap the same forms of 
awareness that individuals with this disorder report having.   
       
 
7. 5. General Discussion 
Experiment 1 explored the relationship between the psychological self-concept and 
the ownership effect in a population of typically developing adults while Experiment 
2 extended this to examine the nature of the self-reference bias in the domain of 
ownership in a population of adults with ASD. 
In both Experiments 1 and 2 the participants in the comparison group showed 
a robust ownership effect. The effect found was large and consistent, implying that 
the self-reference effect is reliable and resilient in this area. One potential limitation of 
Experiment 1 is the gender imbalance (the sample comprised 95% females).  The 
percentage of females in our study was very similar to the percentage in the sample 
employed by Cunningham et al. (2008) (90% females in their study).  In this respect, 
therefore, our replication of Cunningham et al.’s findings is particularly striking.  
However, this gender imbalance may mean that the results reported in the current 
study, as well as the results reported by Cunningham et al., may not be representative 
of neurotypical males/the general population.  However, mitigating against this 
somewhat is the fact that in Experiment 2 we observed a large ownership effect 
among a sample of neurotypical adults that comprised predominantly males (75% 
males in Experiment 2).  Nonetheless, future replications of this effect in a larger 
sample of male participants would be welcome.   
         The robustness of the ownership effect seen in the current study supports the 
view that a sense of ownership influences memory to a significant extent. The pattern 
of self-reference seen here is typical of the self-reference pattern seen in studies that 
directly test other aspects of the self-concept, for example, by using visually or 
verbally presented linguistic descriptors (Engelkamp, 1982; Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 
1977). Our findings are also relevant to the on-going debate about whether ownership 
can be considered to be a process dependent upon physical contact with the object in 
question or whether it is entirely psychological in nature. It has been suggested by 
Cunningham et al. (2007), that physical contact has no influence on the strength of the 
ownership effect observed and the current findings support this view. While our 
participants did handle the self-owned objects, importantly, they also handled the 
other owned objects, and yet, the ownership effect persisted. 
            In contrast to the robust ownership effect found in the comparison group, the 
ownership effect was absent in the ASD group, with items from both the self-referent 
and other-referent conditions being recalled equally well. However, overall numbers 
of items correctly recognised did not differ between groups; the ASD group simply 
recognised near equal numbers of self and other referent words, rather than showing a 
preference for self-referent words. This implies that the pattern of performance seen 
in the group with ASD was not due to a general impairment in memory, nor general 
inattention to the task or objects. This is in line with the results of studies of other 
aspects of the self-reference effect in ASD – for example, Lombardo, Barnes, 
Wheelright and Baron-Cohen (2007) found a similar pattern of results when memory 
for self and other referent trait adjectives was considered. The results support our 
initial predictions that aspects of the psychological self-concept are impaired in ASD 
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while the physical self-concept remains relatively unimpaired (Williams 2010; Lind, 
2010).   
Having established that the ownership effect is robust in comparison 
participants in both studies and absent in the ASD group, we can consider the nature 
of the relationship between the ownership effect and the self. It had been hypothesised 
that the ownership effect depended on a sense of the psychological self that is 
diminished in ASD.  The logic behind this hypothesis is that, in order for information 
to be processed in relation to the self (and hence encoded deeply, relative to other 
information), one’s sense of self/self-concept needs to be intact.  We hypothesised 
that this sense of self/self-concept is diminished in ASD and, thus, that information 
would not be processed in the self-relevant manner that it can be among neurotypical 
individuals.  Our results are in keeping with this hypothesis.  However, one alternative 
explanation for the current set of results is that awareness/sense of the psychological 
self is undiminished in ASD, but somehow “blocked” from influencing memory3.  
Although this alternative explanation of the current results is conceptually possible, 
we believe that our initial explanation is more likely to be true.  If it were the case that 
psychological self-awareness was undiminished in ASD, but prevented from 
influencing cognition (presumably because of atypical connectivity between neuro-
cognitive mechanisms/brain regions), then we would not expect to see significant 
impairments among people with ASD on more direct tests of psychological self-
awareness (i.e., tests that do not measure self-awareness indirectly via its influence on 
cognition).  Arguably, therefore, the fact that many studies have shown ASD-specific 
impairments on such direct tests of psychological self-awareness (see Williams, 2010) 
makes it plausible to suggest that diminished self-awareness in ASD was a direct 
cause of the reduced ownership effect among participants with ASD in the current 
study. 
However, while our results support this view, they also raise further issues. In 
Experiment 1, the strength of the ownership effect did not correlate with any aspect 
performance on the PSC, a questionnaire conventionally used to measure aspects of 
the self-concept. This suggests that if the ownership effect is reliant on an aspect of 
self, it is not measured by this instrument (although there was a near-significant 
correlation between the size of the ownership effect and PSC scores among the 
smaller sample of neurotypical adults in Experiment 2).  However, in Experiment 1, 
the strength of the ownership effect did correlate with scores on the AQ, a measure of 
ASD traits used in both clinical and subclinical populations, and again based on self-
report.  This suggests that whatever the underlying basis of the ownership effect is, it 
is related to ASD traits in the general population.   
In conclusion, the current study demonstrates a robust self-reference effect 
using the ownership task in neurotypical adults that is significantly impaired in 
participants diagnosed with ASD.  This sheds light both on the nature of the self-
concept in ASD, and the relation between sense of self and the self-reference effect 
manifested by the ownership effect.    
 
  
14 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research was completed in partial fulfilment of Emma Grisdale’s doctoral 
degree, which was funded by a Durham University PhD studentship.  The authors 
wish to thank sincerely Sheila Cunningham for the use of her testing materials and her 
help with task development.  We are extremely grateful to all the participants in this 
research. 
 
  
15 
 
Footnotes 
1. We employed corrected hit rate as our primary measure of memory task 
performance, rather than another commonly used measure – d’– in order to facilitate 
comparison with previous studies of the ownership effect, each of which employed 
corrected hit rate.  However, it is important to note that when data from the current 
study were calculated using d’, the results were substantively the same as when using 
corrected hit rate. 
2. It is important to note that, during the study phase of the experiment, the border 
colour of stimuli was not counterbalanced across conditions (self-owned stimuli 
always had a red border and other-owned stimuli always had a blue border).  To 
ensure that the ownership effect that we found was not merely a product of the 
different border colour of stimuli in each condition, we conducted a pilot study in 
which we reversed the border colour of the stimuli across conditions (self-owned 
stimuli always had a blue border and other-owned stimuli always had a red border).  
Out of the 10 participants who completed this alternative version of the task, all 10 
showed an ownership effect and a mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of condition on mean corrected hit rate, reflecting superior recognition of self-owned 
items than other-owned items, F(1,9) = 30.68, p < .001, ηp2= 0.77.  Thus, it is highly 
unlikely that the ownership effect we observed in the main study was merely an 
artefact of the red border colour of self-owned stimuli. 
3.  We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this alternative 
explanation.    
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Tables  
 
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations For Hit Rates, False Alarm Rates and 
Corrected Hit Rates in Each Condition (Experiment 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Measure Condition M SD 
Hit rate Self-owned .65 .15 
 Other-owned .45 .14 
False alarm rate N/A .18 .11 
Corrected hit rate Self-owned .46 .18 
 Other-owned .26 .13 
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Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Participant Characteristics for Experiment 2 (Means, Standard Deviations and Inferential 
Statistics) 
 Group    
 ASD              
(n = 16; 13 male) 
Neurotypical  
(n = 16; 12 male) 
t p Cohen’s d 
Age (years) 31.33 (9.91) 35.31 (14.70) -0.90 .38 0.32 
VIQ 110.19 (13.99) 113.07 (13.78) -0.59 .56 0.21 
PIQ 112.53 (14.21) 116.69 (10.86)  -0.92 .37 0.30 
FSIQ 112.31 (14.49) 116.63 (12.44) -0.90 .37 0.32 
AQ Total Score 34.63 (9.90) 14.56 (5.59) 7.06 <.001 2.50 
ADOS Social + 
Communication Score 
12.54 (2.06) -    
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Hit Rates, False Alarm Rates and Corrected Hit 
Rates for Each Group in Each Condition (Experiment 2) 
 
 Condition ASD  Comparison  
  M SD M SD 
Hit rate  
 
Self-owned .66 .16 .73 .12 
Other-owned .67 .14 .65 .12 
False alarm rate N/A .11 .07 .13 .05 
Corrected hit rate 
 
Self-owned .55 .18 .61 .12 
Other-owned .56 .16 .52 .11 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
